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Introduction 
Lively discussions on Eurobonds resurface 
whenever the outlook on the eurozone’s 
future seems to worsen. The term 
‘Eurobonds’ refers to common issuance of 
debt among eurozone countries. However, as 
the concept of Eurobonds is vague, public 
debate is often clouded by confusion on the 
possible aims and forms of such instruments.  
The briefing firstly discusses the reason why 
Eurobonds are considered in the current 
policy debate (part 1). Subsequently, the 
Eurobond concept is defined, as well as its 
main design options (part 2). The key 
economic, political and legal challenges for 
their introduction will be discussed 
afterwards (part 3). Finally, possible next 
steps, reconciling the different views on the 
timing and conditions to be met, will be 
discussed in part 4. 
1. Why Eurobonds? 
Eurobonds were originally discussed as an 
advanced form of debt management 
cooperation offering potential efficiency 
gains1. By integrating the fragmented national 
public debt markets, Eurobonds’ higher 
liquidity would lower the average 
borrowing cost of the eurozone. Ideally, 
rivalling US Treasury Bonds in their ‘safe-
haven’ status, Eurobonds would furthermore 
promote the role of the euro as a reserve 
currency.  
As the eurozone debt crisis led to significant 
and highly volatile interest rate spreads on 
                                                 
1 Giovanni Group (2000), Report on co-ordinated 
issuance of public debt in the euro area. 
The recurrent debate on 
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misconceptions. This Policy Brief 
clarifies their aims and possible 
forms, before discussing the key 
challenges for their introduction. It 
argues that, by ensuring market 
access to vulnerable Member 
States, Eurobonds can constitute a 
valuable tool to alleviate the 
eurozone crisis. To make use of 
their short-term potential, a condi-
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limited scheme, seems the best 
achievable approach. 
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German bonds, an additional argument in 
favour of introducing Eurobonds emerged. 
Common issuance of debt would ease the 
sovereign debt crisis by providing better 
market access for vulnerable Member States. 
The stability of financial institutions 
would also be reinforced in the short term, as 
Eurobonds would reduce their vulnerability 
to volatility in sovereign bond markets.  
The underlying assumption for the short-
term introduction of Eurobonds is that 
countries under market pressure suffer - 
at least to a considerable extent - from 
liquidity problems. Under this assumption, 
these countries can have structural problems, 
but are on a relatively sustainable path. Yet, 
market uncertainty and self-fulfilling 
prophecies of insolvency force them to pay 
very high interest rates on their debt. This 
makes their debt grow fast and can ultimately 
make it indeed difficult for these countries to 
reimburse their debt. This would turn the 
‘liquidity’ problems into a ‘solvency’ crisis. 
‘Contagion’ would in turn amplify the 
downward spiral, as investors would re-
evaluate the risk of default of other countries 
facing similar difficulties. Consequently, 
current sovereign bond spreads would be 
explained, to a significant extent, by 
‘mispricing’ due to unwarranted risk 
aversion and/or herd behaviour among 
investors.  
It is important to underscore that 
Eurobonds neither have a direct impact 
on current account imbalances and 
primary deficits, nor on the promotion of 
growth. Only in their purported capacity of 
restoring global confidence and stability in 
the eurozone can they help prevent 
insolvency and promote growth. 
Accompanying economic and budgetary 
policies remain therefore indispensable. 
2. The ‘Eurobond’ concept 
2.1. A definition of Eurobonds 
‘Eurobonds’ (or ‘stability bonds’ in the 
Commission’s wording) refer to commonly 
issued public bonds guaranteed by 
eurozone countries. The commonly issued 
debt thus involves the pooling of Member 
States’ respective credit risks and guarantees. 
‘Weak’ Member States, in the sense that they 
are currently facing strong market pressure 
and high interest rates, would thereby benefit 
from the credit worthiness and guarantees of 
‘strong’ Member States. Issuance of 
Eurobonds would likely – but not 
necessarily_– be centralised in a single 
European agency. 
Eurobonds involve sharing risks rather 
than sharing a ‘common’ debt. Each 
country remains liable for repaying its own 
share of debt issued through Eurobonds. 
Only if a country fails to meet its payment 
obligations (i.e. it defaults) can creditors call 
upon the liabilities of other countries. 
Eurobonds have some similarities with 
existing forms of jointly guaranteed debt 
issuances that finance European lending 
programmes. The Commission already 
borrows on the financial markets by issuing 
debt that is guaranteed by the EU budget 
(hence ultimately by all Member States)2. 
Moreover, the borrowing operations of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
are guaranteed by eurozone members. 
                                                 
2 These borrowing operations are used for Balance 
of Payment Support, the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and Macro-financial 
Assistance Programmes. 
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Eurobonds should, however, not be 
confused with ‘project bonds’, which are 
fundamentally different instruments; 
project bonds benefit from European 
guarantees, but are issued by companies. 
They further aim at facilitating the financing 
of specific infrastructure projects rather than 
general government expenses. 
2.2. Key Eurobond design options 
The many conceivable types of Eurobonds 
can be defined by some key characteristics. 
Size of the Eurobond market 
The size of the Eurobond market will depend 
on the degree of substitution of national 
debt issuances by Eurobonds. With full 
substitution, national debt issuances are 
discontinued and government debt 
financing is entirely covered by 
Eurobonds. In addition, past national debt 
could possibly be exchanged for Eurobonds. 
With limited substitution, national debt 
issuances continue to exist along 
Eurobonds. A ceiling, expressed in relative 
terms, is generally used to determine the 
volume of debt that can be financed with 
Eurobonds (e.g. relative to a country’s GDP). 
If recourse to the Eurobond scheme is not 
mandatory, some ’strong’ countries would 
likely finance themselves exclusively through 
their national bonds. This might lower the 
credit rating of Eurobonds, as only ’weak’ 
countries would issue debt through 
Eurobonds.  
Under the limited substitution option, debt 
financing beyond the limit set on Eurobonds 
would be financed by national debt. The 
attached guarantees would - at least de facto 
but possibly de jure - make Eurobonds senior 
to national bonds. If the market pressure on 
the remaining national debt issuances proves 
‘excessive’, Eurobonds’ objectives of 
ensuring the borrowing resilience of ‘weak’ 
countries and preventing contagion would 
not be met. 
Guarantee structure 
With ‘proportionate guarantees’ (also 
referred to as ‘pro-rata’ or ‘several’ 
guarantees) each guaranteeing Member 
State is only liable for its share of 
Eurobonds liabilities. Liability would be 
based on a specific contribution key, which 
can, inter alia, be based on the Member States’ 
share in issued Eurobonds, ECB capital, EU 
budget or GDP. The EFSF and the ESM 
function on this basis. 
With ‘joint and several guarantees’, each 
country is liable not only for its own share 
of Eurobond issuances but also for the 
share of any other Member State failing to 
honour its obligations. Such a form of 
guarantee would in theory be stronger than a 
‘proportionate’ guarantee and would thus 
lower Eurobond borrowing costs. 
If needed, the Eurobonds’ guarantee can 
be enhanced by other means. This can 
involve legal seniority status (over national 
debt issuances) or collateralisation (with 
cash, gold, shares of public companies, 
earmarking on fiscal revenues, etc.). 
 Conditionalities 
Participation of a Member State to the 
Eurobonds’ issuances can be made 
conditional on meeting specific criteria 
and/or the agreement by other 
participating countries. Specific criteria 
could, for example, involve meeting strict 
fiscal and macro-economic thresholds, 
having adopted binding fiscal rules and not 
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being engaged in an EU/IMF adjustment 
programme. Besides specific criteria, 
participation in Eurobonds can also be 
conditional on the consent of other eurozone 
countries and perhaps the Commission.  
Main proposals 
The three most often cited proposals involve 
limited substitution of national debt and 
‘joint and several’ liability, with a varying 
degree of conditionality. 
Firstly, the Blue Bond proposal would 
replace up to 60% of GDP of national debt 
by Eurobonds, with the residual debt 
remaining national. The right of Member 
States to issue Eurobonds would depend on 
their compliance with the EU’s fiscal rules.  
Secondly, the Redemption Fund proposal 
would bring together all national debts above 
the 60% of GDP threshold into one fund. 
Debt in this fund would be financed by 
Eurobonds. Member States would then be 
obliged to redeem (i.e. reduce to zero) their 
part of the fund within a 20-25 year 
timeframe, after which the fund would 
expire. 
Finally, the Euro-bills proposal would 
introduce common debt issuances with a 
short-term maturity (one year at most), which 
would then co-exist with long-term national 
debt. Under the proposal, the size of the 
Euro-bills market would be 10% of GDP at 
most3. 
                                                 
3 See ‘Blue Bond/Red Bond’ proposal (Delpla – 
von Weizsacker, 2010), the ‘Redemption Fund’ 
proposal (German Council of Economic Experts, 
2011) and the ‘Eurobills’ proposal (Hellwig – 
Philippon, 2011).  
3. Challenges to the introduction of 
Eurobonds 
Considerable challenges would have to be 
overcome to ensure Eurobonds’ political, 
economic and legal feasibility. They involve 
having adequate control mechanisms in place 
to address moral hazard concerns, balancing 
expected economic gains and losses, as well 
as ensuring Eurobonds’ legal soundness. 
3.1. Economic Union and moral hazard 
considerations 
Despite their inconsistent and possible 
currently excessive disciplining effect, 
markets have demonstrated some efficiency 
at incentivising Member States to correct 
fiscal deficits and economic imbalances. The 
major and most often heard argument against 
Eurobonds is therefore that by removing the 
discipline imposed by markets on 
governments, Eurobonds would create so-
called ‘moral hazard’. Governments 
benefiting from lower yields might have 
the incentive to run inappropriate policies 
leading to (further) public debt concerns and 
a lack of economic competitiveness; the 
negative consequences of which would 
ultimately be borne by others. With 
Eurobonds, the stronger the insurance 
provided to ‘weak’ countries - through the 
guarantees, collaterals, and credit worthiness 
of ‘strong’ countries - the stronger the moral 
hazard issue.  
This trade-off between insurance and 
moral hazard is inherent in any insurance 
scheme. Taken too strictly and given the 
safeguards already provided by the revised 
EU economic governance framework, the 
moral hazard argument can tend to 
exaggerate the drive towards deficits and 
debt. Yet, to manage concerns and ensure 
political feasibility, any Eurobond 
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introduction would need to compensate for 
this alleged reduction of discipline by other 
mechanisms. 
Different solutions are possible. In general, 
stronger disciplining mechanisms and 
safeguards within a reinforced Economic 
Union could pre-condition the introduction 
of Eurobonds. Solidarity implied by 
Eurobonds would come with better control 
of fiscal and macro-economic imbalances. 
This control is subsequently difficult without 
some political accountability. Steps towards a 
‘Political Union’ would in turn be necessary.  
In order to reduce moral hazard, the 
Eurobonds’ design could also limit the 
benefits obtained by ‘weak’ Member 
States. Member States could be required to 
partly finance themselves with national debt, 
which would allow for market scrutiny of 
individual Member States. Alternately, the 
benefits of Eurobonds could depend on a 
Member State’s credit worthiness or their 
respect of the economic governance rules 
(see 2.2). If properly designed, 
conditionalities might not only be able to 
reduce moral hazard, but could also become 
a driver for better fiscal and economic 
policies. 
3.2. Economic considerations 
Eurobonds would make economic sense 
if they were to lower the global average 
borrowing cost of eurozone countries, i.e. if 
the interest rate of Eurobonds is below the 
weighted average of participating countries’ 
current interest rates. 
The extent to which investors will value 
Eurobonds below this weighted average 
depends on several factors. The stronger 
the guarantees and other collaterals, the 
lower the perceived risk of default and hence 
the lower the interest rates asked by 
investors. Liquidity gains due to the larger 
size of the Eurobond market can be 
expected, but should, however, be quite 
limited4. Perhaps most significantly, by 
providing affordable interest rates to ‘weak’ 
countries, current excessive mispricing due 
to speculation and market uncertainty 
would be limited, thereby significantly 
lowering the average funding cost of the 
eurozone5. 
However, even when benefiting from 
important absolute gains, Eurobonds’ yield 
levels would likely still lie higher than the 
current very low bond yields in Germany 
and other triple-A Member States. The lower 
interest rates that would be obtained by 
countries currently under financial market 
pressure would thus come at the expense of 
the most creditworthy countries. Eurobonds 
would thus, indirectly, result in transfers 
from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ eurozone 
countries. The scale of such solidarity is 
inherently uncertain, as it depends on the 
yields of future Eurobonds. 
However, the losses for creditworthy 
countries can be compensated. One 
option to work towards a ‘win-win’ situation 
is to redistribute the gains and costs of 
Eurobonds. By assigning different interest 
rates to each country, reflecting their relative 
performance, ‘winners’ of the scheme (e.g. 
Spain) would compensate ‘losers’ (e.g. 
                                                 
4 Were it to reach the size of the US government 
bond market, one could expect rather limited gains, 
estimated between 10 and 20 basis points according 
to the Commission. See: Green Paper on the 
feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds, European 
Commission, COM(2011) 818. 
5 Again this expected gain crucially depends on the 
interpretation of the causes of the crisis, and of the 
interpretation of spreads divergence. See Part 1 on 
the rationale for Eurobonds. 
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Germany). Such a compensation scheme 
would, however, not work if Eurobond yields 
are too high. The Eurobond scheme could 
also be limited in time and volume, in order 
to cap the level of solidarity.  
A broader perspective on relative costs 
and gains would also help to reach a 
consensus. In particular, this could involve 
the acknowledgment that extremely low 
interest rates in core eurozone countries are 
partly resulting from the crisis itself, as capital 
flight from the riskier periphery to the safer 
core takes place. More generally, the political 
feasibility of issuing Eurobonds will depend 
on ‘strong’ countries’ own perception of the 
risks and costs associated with a protracted 
crisis, possible additional bailouts and/or a 
break-up of the eurozone. 
3.3. Legal considerations 
The legal problems related to the 
introduction of Eurobonds depend on the 
specific design. Ensuring the legal 
compatibility of Eurobonds benefiting from 
joint and several guarantees would be 
more challenging than Eurobonds with 
‘proportionate’ (i.e. not joint) guarantees, 
as the former imply a greater level of risk-
sharing. 
On the EU level, the no-bailout clause 
(Article 125(1) TFEU) constitutes the prime 
legal obstacle. The clause prohibits the EU 
and the Member States from assuming the 
financial commitments of (other) Member 
States. Yet, Eurobonds would precisely imply 
that Member States agree to take over the 
commitments of other Member States when 
needed. 
Policy-makers can try to work around the 
restrictions of the no-bailout clause. 
Firstly, the clause does not prevent the 
Member States from assuming EU 
commitments. Therefore, an EU body could 
be legally responsible for repaying 
Eurobonds, while Member States would in 
turn guarantee the EU body’s financial 
obligations. Alternatively, Eurobonds could 
be defined as a specific project, for which the 
no-bailout clause provides an exception. 
Working around the no-bailout clause is 
likely to leave some legal uncertainty, an 
option that creditworthy countries seek to 
exclude. Eurobonds could therefore 
necessitate a modification of EU primary 
law, or at least the commitment to do so in 
the near future. Making use of the simplified 
revision procedure is conceivable, but would 
still require ratification in all Member States. 
The procedure can furthermore not lead to 
an increase in the EU’s competences and 
would hence likely lead to an 
intergovernmental approach. The alternative 
is a full-blown Treaty reform. This tends to 
be a drawn-out process, but can be 
accelerated if needed.  
Besides the legal issues on the EU level, 
Eurobonds also pose problems with 
regard to German law. The German 
Constitutional Court ruled that the country 
cannot participate in a permanent mechanism 
in which it assumes the liability for other 
Member States' voluntary decisions. 
However, the Court’s verdict leaves some 
room for Eurobonds, as long as the German 
liability is precise, limited in size, and subject 
to regular approval by the German 
Parliament6. 
                                                 
6 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Ruling 
of 7 September 2011, Case 2 BvR 987/10. 
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4. Steps towards Eurobonds 
Major differences exist among Member 
States on if, how and when Eurobonds 
should be introduced. Especially the timing is 
a matter of vivid disagreements. 
Some advocate the short-term introduction 
of Eurobonds. Such a move would be of 
major use in addressing the ongoing crisis, 
although it would be difficult to address all 
the aforementioned challenges. Despite the 
potential advantages, the prompt 
introduction of Eurobonds seems politically 
difficult. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the idea 
of introducing Eurobonds as the 
conclusion of an Economic and Political 
Union, requiring long-term reforms. This 
approach is politically the most feasible. Yet, 
the mere agreement on a possible 
introduction of Eurobonds in the long term 
will not help address the ongoing crisis. 
Given the limits of both the short-term and 
long-term views, a precise roadmap 
emerges as the best achievable option. 
Such a roadmap would include a timeline and 
conditions for a gradual introduction of 
Eurobonds. A first tangible step could 
consist in a pilot project whose limited size, 
guarantees and/or maturity would reduce 
concerns linked to Eurobonds7. By offering a 
limited short-term alternative source of 
financing to countries under market pressure, 
it could prove useful in mitigating the current 
crisis. If the pilot project were to have 
encouraging results, it would pave the way 
                                                 
7 Such a roadmap could include elements of the 
draft report by the European Parliament, although 
other options are also conceivable (notably a reform 
of the ESM). See: European Parliament, 2012, Draft 
report on the feasibility of introducing Stability 
Bonds, 2012/2028(INI), 4 June. 
towards an Economic and Political Union 
and a fully-fledged system of Eurobonds. 
Conclusion  
So far, the EU has proven ineffective at 
managing the risk that self-fulfilling 
prophecies of insolvency lead to an 
unsustainable rise in a Member State’s 
borrowing costs. The limited size and strong 
conditionality of the assistance mechanism 
(EFSF/ESM) constrains its capacity at 
preventing this risk. As for the ECB’s 
reluctant interventions, they have shown their 
limits in restoring confidence and cannot 
substitute for a coherent and concerted 
political response to the crisis. The lack of an 
adequate response to the intensifying liquidity 
problems further aggravates the crisis and 
increasingly puts the sustainability of the 
common currency into question. 
Eurobonds can be part of a comprehensive 
response to the crisis. They can help ‘weak’ 
Member States retain access to financial 
markets. This would in turn improve their 
outlook and reduce the risk of contagion to 
other Member States. However, eurozone 
countries would still crucially need to address 
the root causes of the crisis, i.e. unsustainable 
fiscal policies and/or major economic 
imbalances. Yet, Eurobonds would offer the 
time and means to carry out the necessary 
reforms. Moreover, participation in 
Eurobond issuances could be made 
conditional on compliance with European 
economic governance rules, thereby 
supporting the implementation of these rules. 
Despite the immediate advantages of 
Eurobonds, the political feasibility for their 
swift introduction seems limited. However, if 
Eurobonds were only to be considered as a 
long-term possibility, when an eventual 
Economic and Political Union is achieved, 
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
8 
 
their potential at restoring confidence in the 
eurozone would be lost. 
Taking into account the limits of both the 
short-term and the long-term perspectives, 
the best achievable outcome is a gradual 
approach. This should consist in the 
commitment to work out a clear, conditional 
Eurobonds roadmap, whose most immediate 
step would consist in a limited Eurobonds 
scheme. Such a scheme should allow for 
affordable market access to countries under 
financial market pressure, while 
simultaneously not stretching solidarity 
beyond what is deemed acceptable given the 
current state of economic and fiscal 
integration. 
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